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A Unied Model of Spatial Price Discrimination
Konstantinos Eleftheriou;y and Nickolas J. Michelacakis
Abstract
We present a general model of n rms with di¤erentiated production costs competing in a linear
market within the framework of spatial price discrimination. We prove that the Nash equilibrium
locations of rms are always socially optimal irrespective of the number of competitors, rm hetero-
geneity regarding marginal production costs, the level of privatization, the form of the transportation
costs and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. An immediate implication of this
result is that this form of competition is preferable from a welfare point of view. We also argue
that (i) when rms are homogeneous regarding their marginal production costs, there always exists a
unique Nash equilibrium, regardless of the form of the transportation cost function (ii) when rms are
heterogeneous and transportation costs are linear, there is a unique Nash equilibrium which depends
only on the relative mutual di¤erences of the marginal production costs.
JEL classication: L13; L32; L33; R32
Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; Social optimality; Spatial competition; Di¤erentiated goods
1 Introduction
Whenever we make online purchases from the web, we are witnessing a form of market segmentation due
to discriminatory pricing dependent on geographical location. This pricing practice is called spatial price
discrimination (Cabral, 2000). However, this is not the only market where this type of pricing is common.
Spatial price discrimination manifests itself in markets in which rms are geographically di¤erentiated1
such as the markets of cement and steel or markets of customer-tailored goods. The wide application of this
pricing strategy together with the fact that it is forbidden by some countries when it cannot be justied
on the grounds of transportation/delivery costs (e.g., Robinson-Patman Act, 1936 in the US),2 makes the
investigation of spatial price discrimination of great interest for both academics and policymakers.
The main goal of the current paper is to examine the welfare properties of the equilibrium in a market
where operating rms exercise spatial price discrimination. To this purpose, we develop an integrated model
Department of Economics, University of Piraeus, 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou Street, Piraeus 185 34, Greece. E-mail:
kostasel@otenet.gr (Eleftheriou); njm@unipi.gr (Michelacakis).
yCorresponding author. Tel: +30 210 4142282; Fax: +30 210 4142346
1Greenhut (1981) provides evidence that spatial price discrimination is apparent in cases where transportation cost
represents at least 5% of total costs.
2For a review about the history of the enforcement of competition law against spatial discriminatory pricing, see Scherer
and Ross (1980).
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giving new insight into the structure of customer-specic pricing markets. The existing literature adopts at
least one of the following ve assumptions: (i) the number of rms in the market does not exceed two (ii)
all rms are privately owned (iii) transportation costs are linear (iv) only one homogeneous good is traded
and (v) rms have common marginal production costs. We relax all the above assumptions by assuming
a market with an arbitrary number of heterogeneous competitors, an arbitrary level of privatization for
each rm, a general transportation cost function and an arbitrary number and/or varieties of traded goods.
Firm heterogeneity is reected by assuming di¤erent marginal costs of production. It should be emphasized
that this heterogeneity is rm-specic and not product-specic (i.e., the marginal cost of production di¤ers
across rms but remains the same for all goods/varieties produced by the same rm).
The e¤ect of the above mentioned relaxation on the existence and the properties of the equilibrium
is not clear. For example, dAspremont et al. (1979) showed that in the traditional Hotellings model
(Hotelling, 1929), the nature of travel costs is important for the existence of an equilibrium. Surprisingly
enough, they showed that an equilibrium exists when transportation costs are proportional to the square
of distance while it doesnt when the travel costs are linear. On the other hand, Cremer et al. (1991)
highlighted the importance of the number of competing rms on the welfare properties of the equilibrium.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in manifold ways. We show that in a model
of spatial price discrimination, where the produced goods have the same reservation price for the buyers,
the market outcome will be socially optimal, and this result is independent of the number of rms in the
market, rm heterogeneity regarding marginal production costs, the level of privatization of each rm,
the form of the transportation cost function and the number and/or the varieties of the goods o¤ered
by each competitor. We further argue that (i) when rms are homogeneous regarding their marginal
production costs, there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium, regardless of the form of the transportation
cost function extending a well-known similar result (e.g. Heywood and Ye, 2009a) restricted to linear
transportation costs and (ii) when rms are heterogeneous and transportation costs are linear, there is a
unique Nash equilibrium which does not depend on the distribution of the marginal production costs.
The driving force behind our welfare result is the same as in Lederer and Hurter (1986); a rm can
increase its prot by opting for a production location so that the market is serviced with minimal total
cost.3 However, in Lederer and Hurter (1986) the discussion is restricted to only two exclusively privately
owned rms o¤ering the same good leaving untouched mixed markets with many competitors and multiple
goods and the ensuing welfare questions. Moreover, our proof is completely di¤erent to the one found in
Lederer and Hurter (1986) allowing for direct generalization.
3This implies the alignment of the social and private optima.
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Our ndings about the characterization of the equilibrium are also in line with Vogel (2011). Vogel
(2011) proves the existence of a unique equilibrium for an arbitrary number of heterogeneous rms lo-
cated in a circular market competing within the framework of spatial price discrimination bearing linear
transportation costs, regardless of the distribution of their marginal production costs. We investigate the
properties of the equilibrium, should it exist, when an arbitrary number of heterogeneous rms with various
degrees of privatization o¤ering multiple goods compete in a linear market under spatial price discrimina-
tion. In line with Vogel (2011), we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium when transportation costs
are linear. We succeed, however, in establishing the social optimality of the Nash equilibrium in all cases.
Moreover, the fact that our model imposes no constraints on the level of privatization extends our
contribution to the theory of mixed oligopoly under spatial price discrimination. The studies which are
closest to ours are those of Heywood and Ye (2009a) and Heywood and Ye (2009b). Heywood and Ye
(2009a) assume a market with an arbitrary number of homogeneous rms having binary ownership status
(private or public) and focus on the role of the public rm in the Stackelberg equilibrium where the
leader is a private or a public rm. They extend their model accounting for the existence of foreign
rms in Heywood and Ye (2009b). The aforementioned papers impose too many restrictions in their
modeling structure. Specically, the framework of Heywood and Ye (2009a) and Heywood and Ye (2009b)
imposes restrictions on the form of the transportation cost function, the degree of privatization and the
attributes/number of goods in the market. In addition, a fundamental restriction of the aforementioned
papers lies in the assumption of common marginal production costs.
Our paper is part of a wide literature on the welfare implications of spatial price discrimination; see,
e.g., Greenhut and Ohta (1972), Holahan (1975), Thisse and Vives (1988), Hamilton et al. (1989), Hamilton
et al. (1991), MacLeod et al. (1992), and Braid (2008). Building on this literature, we make inroads into
the theory of mixed oligopoly when rms have di¤erentiated marginal production costs.
The implications of our results can be summarized as follows: (i) A spatial price discriminatory market
can serve as a typical example of how a laissez-faireeconomy can lead to social optimality, (ii) the social
optimality of the equilibrium is independent of rm heterogeneity and (iii) the dependence of the equilib-
rium locations on the relative di¤erence of the marginal production costs has important policy implications
for government intervention. In the example of subsection 3.2 the government can (pre)determine the lo-
cations of rms through intervention on the marginal production costs (e.g., tax incentives and subsidies
for rms located in low-populated areas etc.) without a¤ecting social optimality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the benchmark model where
an arbitrary number of rms characterized by a di¤erent degree of privatization o¤er a homogeneous
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good. Two cases are examined: (a) rms have common marginal production costs and (b) rms are
heterogeneous. The market is represented by a unit interval with the consumers uniformly distributed
along it. A three-stage game of complete information is played by rms and consumers. More specically,
in the rst stage rms simultaneously choose their locations. In the second stage, after observing their
competitorslocations, rms engage in Bertrand competition à la Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer
(1937). In other words, rms set their prices simultaneously and are allowed to price discriminate by
charging a di¤erent price for di¤erent locations. Finally, in stage three, consumers make their purchasing
choices to clear the market. After presenting our theoretical construct, we solve the game and characterize
the Nash equilibrium. Section 3 generalizes the ndings of section 2 for the case of multiple goods (or
di¤erent varieties of the same good), section 4 concludes.
2 The benchmark model
We consider a market consisted of n private rms and a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed
over the unit interval [0; 1] representing a linear country.4 Let xi, i = 1; :::; n, denote the location of rm
i in the interval [0; 1] with 0  x1 < x2 < ::: < xn  1. All rms produce and sell the same homogeneous
good. Each consumer buys one unit of the good from the lowest price rm, providing that this price is
lower or equal to her reservation price (i.e., the maximum price that the consumers are willing to pay for
the good), m > 0. The marginal production cost of rm i is ci  0. Spatial price discrimination à la
Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer (1937) is assumed. Specically, the price charged for the good by
the rm the consumer chooses to buy from, is equal to (or innitesimally less than) the delivered cost of
the remaining rms. Delivered costs are equal to the sum of transportation and production costs. Let
f(d(x0; x1)) := jF (x1)  F (x0)j evaluate the transportation cost between points x0 and x1, where d denotes
the shipped distance and F be any function with F 0 positive and continuous on [0; 1]. Firms are located
such that f(d(xi+j; xi)) > jci+j   cij (non-negative prot condition)5 for any j > 0 with i; i+ j 2 f1; :::; ng
and ci+j, ci the corresponding marginal costs of rms i+ j and i located at points xi+j and xi respectively.
Let si;i+j denote the locations of the indi¤erent consumer with respect to rms i and i+ j.
Lemma 1. (i) xi < si;i+j < xi+j and F (si;i+j) =
F (xi+j)+F (xi)
2
+
ci+j ci
2
and (ii) if j1 < j2 then (a)
si;i+j1 < si;i+j2 and (b) provided j1 < j2 < j, si+j1;i+j < si+j2;i+j.
4By uniformly distributed, we mean that the proportion of consumers buying the good remains the same, regardless of
the subinterval of [0; 1].
5In the opposite case if, f(d(xi+j ; xi))  jci+j   cij, the total sales of either rm i or rm i+ j drop to zero.
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Proof. By denition of si;i+j,
jF (si;i+j)  F (xi)j+ ci = jF (xi+j)  F (si;i+j)j+ ci+j
By assumption F is an increasing function, so if si;i+j 2 [0; xi] [ [xi+j; 1] then
f(d(xi+j; xi)) = F (xi+j)  F (xi) = jci+j   cij
a contradiction, thus, xi < si;i+j < xi+j and F (si;i+j)  F (xi) + ci = F (xi+j)  F (si;i+j) + ci+j i.e.,
F (si;i+j) =
F (xi+j) + F (xi)
2
+
ci+j   ci
2
which proves (i).
To prove (ii) (a) we argue by contradiction. Assume si;i+j1  si;i+j2 , then
F (xi+j1) + F (xi)
2
+
ci+j1   ci
2
 F (xi+j2) + F (xi)
2
+
ci+j2   ci
2
,
F (xi+j2)  F (xi+j1)  ci+j1   ci+j2
equivalently
f(d(xi+j2 ; xi+j1))  jci+j1   ci+j2j
a contradiction. The proof of (ii) (b) follows similar lines.
Consumers and rms engage in a three-stage game of complete information. In stage one, rms simul-
taneously decide their location. Having observed the location of their competitors, rms simultaneously
choose delivered price schedules in the second stage. In the nal stage, consumers take their purchasing
decisions.
The rest of the section is structured as follows. Subsection 2.1 examines the properties of the equilibrium
in the case of privately owned rms with common marginal costs. The case of mixed ownership with
homogeneous rms is analyzed in subsection 2.2. The corresponding analyses for heterogeneous rms are
presented in subsections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.
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2.1 Homogeneous rms
In this subsection, we examine the case where all rms have the same marginal cost of production, i.e.
c1 = c2 = ::: = cn. The existence and social optimality of a symmetric equilibrium (see Proposition 2 below)
provided that transportation costs are linear is known to exist and can be found in various references in the
literature (e.g. Heywood and Ye, 2009a). We provide a di¤erent proof as an intermediate result, relaxing
the assumption of linear transportation costs. In the case of linear transportation costs uniqueness follows
from Proposition 3.
To simplify our analysis and without loss of generality, we set ci = 0. The aggregate shipping cost6 for
all locations z of consumers who buy from any of the n rms is equal to
TH(x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
THi (x1; :::; xn) (1)
where
THi (x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0@ R x10 [F (x1)  F (z)]dz
+
R x1+x2
2
x1
[F (z)  F (x1)]dz
1A for i = 1
0@ R xixi 1+xi2 [F (xi)  F (z)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
[F (z)  F (xi)]dz
1A for 1 < i < n
0@ R xnxn 1+xn2 [F (xn)  F (z)]dz
+
R 1
xn
[F (z)  F (xn)]dz
1A for i = n
(2)
is the total transportation cost for those consumers buying from rm i. As dened in Lederer and Hurter
(1986) the social cost is the total supply cost when rms behave in a cooperative, cost minimizing manner.
The fact that delivered costs coincide with transportation costs implies that the aggregate transportation
cost represents the social cost. Hence, the socially optimal locations can be derived by minimizing the
social cost with respect to each location xi.7
Firm i is selling its product at a price matching (or which is innitesimally less than) the delivery cost
of its direct competitor which is the rm nearest to its location. The indi¤erent consumer between rms i
6The terms delivered costand shipping costare used interchangeably hereafter.
7In other words, social welfare is dened as the total consumers willingness to pay less the aggregate transportation and
production costs.
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and i+ 1, according to Lemma 1, is located at si;i+1 =
xi+xi+1
2
. Thus, the prot function of rm i is
Hi (x1; ::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0@ R x10 [F (x2)  F (z)  F (x1) + F (z)] dz
+
R x1+x2
2
x1
[F (x2)  F (z)  F (z) + F (x1)] dz
1A if i = 1
0BBBB@
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
[F (z)  F (xi 1)  F (xi) + F (z)] dz
+
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi
[F (z)  F (xi 1)  F (z) + F (xi)] dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z)  F (z) + F (xi)] dz
1CCCCA
if 1 < i < n and xi  xi 1+xi+12
0BBBB@
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi
2
[F (z)  F (xi 1)  F (xi) + F (z)] dz
+
R xi
xi 1+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z)  F (xi) + F (z)] dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
[F (xi+1)  F (z)  F (z) + F (xi)] dz
1CCCCA
if 1 < i < n and xi 1+xi+1
2
 xi
0@ R xnxn 1+xn2 [F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (xn) + F (z)] dz
+
R 1
xn
[F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (z) + F (xn)] dz
1A if i = n
(3)
.
Lemma 2. When rms are homogeneous, the marginal aggregate transportation cost with respect to the
location of rm i, i = 1; :::; n, is
@TH=@xi =
8>>><>>>:
F (x1)  F (x2 x12 ) for i = 1
F (xi xi 1
2
)  F (xi+1 xi
2
) for 1 < i < n
F (xn xn 1
2
)  F (1  xn) for i = n
:
Proof. LetG(y) :=
R
F (y)dy, then for all i, 1 < i < n, THi (x1; :::; xn) = [ G(xi   z)]xixi 1+xi
2
+[G(z   xi)]
xi+xi+1
2
xi
=
 2G(0) +G(xi xi 1
2
) +G(xi+1 xi
2
). xi appears in the expression of the aggregate transportation cost only
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in THi 1; T
H
i and T
H
i+1
TH(x1; :::; xn) = T
H
1 (x1; :::; xn) + :::+
 Z xi 1
xi 2+xi 1
2
[F (xi 1)  F (z)]dz +
Z xi 1+xi
2
xi 1
[F (z)  F (xi 1)]dz
!
| {z }
THi 1
+THi (x1; :::; xn) +
 Z xi+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z)]dz +
Z xi+1+xi+2
2
xi+1
[F (z)  F (xi+1)]dz
!
| {z }
THi+1
+ :::+ THn (x1; :::; xn)
Hence, we get
@TH
@xi
=
@THi 1
@xi
+
@THi
@xi
+
@THi+1
@xi
= 1
2
F (xi xi 1
2
) +

1
2
F (xi xi 1
2
)  1
2
F (xi+1 xi
2
)
  1
2
F (xi+1 xi
2
) =
F (xi xi 1
2
)  F (xi+1 xi
2
)
for 1 < i < n. The cases i = 1 and i = n are treated similarly to yield @TH=@x1 = F (x1)  F (x2 x12 ) and
@TH=@xn = F (
xn xn 1
2
)  F (1  xn) completing the proof of the Lemma.
Proposition 1. When rms are homogeneous, the marginal aggregate transportation cost with respect to
the location of rm i, i = 1; :::; n, is opposite to the marginal prot of rm i, i.e.
@TH=@xi =  @Hi =@xi:
Proof. Letting G(y) :=
R
F (y)dy, for 1 < i < n, (3) becomes
Hi (x1; :::; xn) = 2G(
xi+1   xi 1
2
)  2G(xi   xi 1
2
)  2G(xi+1   xi
2
) + 2G(0)
Di¤erentiating the above expression, we get
@Hi
@xi
=  F (xi   xi 1
2
) + F (
xi+1   xi
2
)
For i = 1 and i = n, we get respectively @H1 =@x1 =  F (x1) + F (x2 x12 ) and @Hn =@xn =  F (xn xn 12 ) +
F (1  xn). Lemma 2 completes the proof of the proposition.
Following our discussion above, the socially optimal locations are derived by minimizing (1) with respect
to each rms location. Hence, the socially optimal locations satisfy the system:
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@TH=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (4)
Proposition 1 shows that this is equivalent to:
@Hi =@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (5)
which proves
Proposition 2. In models of spatial price discrimination, where rms are homogeneous, o¤er the same
good and the market is represented by a uni-dimensional interval, the Nash equilibrium locations of rms
are socially optimal.
The next step is to check the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3. In models of n homogeneous rms selling a good to consumers uniformly distributed along
a linear country at prices conditional to consumer location, there always exist a unique Nash equilibrium
which is socially optimal and does not depend on the form of the transportation cost function.
Proof. According to Proposition 2, it su¢ ces to exhibit either a socially optimum or a Nash equilibrium.
We test t of the unique Nash equilibrium when transportation costs are linear, i.e. xi =
2i 1
2n
i = 1; :::; n.8
By Lemma 2, the above solution must satisfy the system OTH(x1; :::; xn) = 0. Indeed, for every 1 < i < n,
we must have F (xi xi 1
2
)   F (xi+1 xi
2
) = 0. But this is equivalent to F (
1
n
2
)   F ( 1n
2
) = 0 which is true
regardless of the transportation cost function f . The border cases are similarly veriable. The uniqueness
of the equilibrium can be proved as follows. The equilibrium satises (by Lemma 2)
F (x1)  F (x2 x12 ) = 0
F (x2 x1
2
)  F (x3 x2
2
) = 0
...
...
F (xn xn 1
2
)  F (1  xn) = 0
8For the derivation of the Nash equilibrium locations under linear transportation costs, see Heywood and Ye (2009a).
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which implies F (x1) = ::: = F (1  xn) = r. Since F is 1  1, there is a unique D = F 1(r) with
F (x1) = q , x1 = D
F (x2 x1
2
) = q () x2 x1
2
= D , x2 = 3D
F (x3 x2
2
) = q () x3 x2
2
= D , x3 = 5D
...
F (xn xn 1
2
) = q , xn xn 1
2
= D , xn = (2n  1)D
F (1  xn) = q , 1  xn = D , xn = 1 D
The last two equations give 1 D = 2nD  D () D = 1
2n
completing the proof.
2.2 Mixed oligopoly with homogeneous rms
In our analysis so far, all rms are privately owned. Let us now assume that single rm l, l = f1; :::; ng is
partly privately owned and partly publicly owned in proportions al and 1   al (in other words al can be
considered as the degree of privatization), respectively with al 2 [0; 1]. In such a case, rm l will decide
about its optimal location by maximizing the weighted average of its own prots and social welfare with
weights al and 1  al, respectively. Social welfare is equal to the sum of the aggregate prots (the prot of
all rms) and consumerssurplus. The consumerssurplus is given by
CSH(x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
CSHi (x1; :::; xn) (6)
where CSHi (x1; :::; xn) is the consumer surplus generated for the consumers buying from rm i, therefore,
10
CSHi (x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
R x1
0
[m  F (x2) + F (z)]dz +
R x1+x2
2
x1
[m  F (x2) + F (z)]dz for i = 1
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
[m  F (z) + F (xi 1)]dz +
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi
[m  F (z) + F (xi 1)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi+1
2
[m  F (xi+1) + F (z)]dz
for xi  xi 1+xi+12 and 1 < i < n
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi
2
[m  F (z) + F (xi 1)]dz +
R xi
xi 1+xi+1
2
[m  F (xi+1) + F (z)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
[m  F (xi+1) + F (z)]dz
for xi 1+xi+1
2
 xi and 1 < i < n
R xn
xn 1+xn
2
[m  f(z   xn 1)]dz +
R 1
xn
[m  f(z   xn 1)]dz for i = n
(7)
Direct calculation proves
Lemma 3. Hi (x1; :::; xn)+ CS
H
i (x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
R x1+x2
2
0
mdz   TH1 (x1; :::; xn) for i = 1
R xi+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi
2
mdz   THi (x1; :::; xn) for 1 < i < n
R 1
xn 1+xn
2
mdz   THn (x1; :::; xn) for i = n
Summing up over all rms one gets the following Proposition which could be viewed as the second main
result of this subsection.
Proposition 4.
nX
i=1
Hi (x1; :::; xn) + CS
H(x1; :::; xn) = m  TH(x1; :::; xn)
Proof. Straightforward calculations.
The prot function of the partly publicly owned rm l will be
Hl (x1; :::; xn) = 
H
l (x1; :::; xn) + (1  al)
"X
i6=l
Hi (x1; :::; xn) + CS
H(x1; :::; xn)
#
(8)
where Hl would be the prot function of rm l if it was fully privately owned.
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Proposition 5. When rms are homogeneous, Nash equilibria remain socially optimal regardless of the
degree of privatization of the individual rms l; 1  l  n.
Proof. Fix a random l; 1  l  n. Using Proposition 4 and (8), we get
Hl (x1; :::; xn) = 
H
l (x1; :::; xn) + (1  al)

m  TH(x1; :::; xn)  Hl (x1; :::; xn)

From Proposition 1
@TH=@xl =  @Hl =@xl ()  @TH=@xl   @Hl =@xl = 0
which implies that @ Hl =@xl = @
H
l =@xl. Induction on i completes the proof.
2.3 Heterogeneous rms
In this subsection, we study the case of n rms producing with di¤erent marginal production costs.
In consistency with our notation above, let si;i+j denote the locations of the indi¤erent consumer. Then
the prot of rm i, Ni (x1; :::; xn), is given by
N1 (x1; :::; xn) =
Z s1;2
0
[f(d(x2; z)) + c2   f(d(x1; z))  c1]dz
Ni (x1; :::; xn) =
Z si 1;i+1
si 1;i
[f(d(z; xi 1)) + ci 1   f(d(z; xi))  ci]dz
+
Z si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[f(d(xi+1; z)) + ci+1   f(d(z; xi))  ci]dz
Nn (x1; :::; xn) =
Z 1
sn 1;n
[f(d(z; xn 1)) + cn 1   f(d(z; xn))  cn]dz
The next Lemma relates the prot of rm i in this case, Ni (x1; :::; xn), to the corresponding prot of
the same rm, Hi (x1; :::; xn), if all marginal costs were equal.
Lemma 4.
N1 (x1; :::; xn) = 
H
1 (x1; :::; xn) + (c2   c1)x1+x22
+
R s1;2
x1+x2
2
[F (x1) + F (x2)  2F (z) + c2   c1]dz
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Ni (x1; :::; xn) = 
H
i (x1; :::; xn)
  R si 1;ixi 1+xi
2
[F (z)  F (xi 1) + ci 1   F (xi) + F (z)  ci]dz
+
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z) + ci+1   F (z) + F (xi)  ci]dz
  R si 1;i+1xi 1+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z) + ci+1   F (z) + F (xi 1)  ci 1]dz
+(ci 1   ci)xi+1 xi2 + (ci+1   ci)xi xi 12
Nn (x1; :::; xn) = 
H
n (x1; :::; xn)
  R sn 1;nxn 1+xn
2
[2F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (xn) + cn 1   cn] dz
+(cn 1   cn)xn xn 12
+(cn 1   cn)(1  xn)
Proof.
N1 (x1; :::; xn) =
R s1;2
0
[f(d(x2; z)) + c2   f(d(x1; z))  c1] dz
=
R x1
0
[F (x2)  F (z) + c2   (F (x1)  F (z) + c1)] dz
+
R x1+x2
2
x1
[F (x2)  F (z) + c2   (F (z)  F (x1) + c1)] dz
+
R s1;2
x1+x2
2
[F (x2)  F (z) + c2   (F (z)  F (x1) + c1)] dz
=
R x1
0
[F (x2)  F (z)  F (x1) + F (z)]dz
+(c2   c1)x1
+
R x1+x2
2
x1
[F (x2)  F (z)  F (z) + F (x1)]dz
+(c2   c1)x2 x12
+
R s1;2
x1+x2
2
[F (x1) + F (x2)  2F (z) + c2   c1]dz
= H1 (x1; :::; xn)
+(c2   c1)x2+x12
+
R s1;2
x1+x2
2
[F (x1) + F (x2)  2F (z) + c2   c1]dz
which settles the proof for N1 (x1; :::; xn). To prove the Lemma for the 
N
i (x1; :::; xn), without any real loss
of generality, we consider the case xi < si 1;i <
xi 1+xi
2
< xi <
xi 1+xi+1
2
< xi+xi+1
2
< si 1;i+1 < si;i+1 < xi+1.
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Then,
Ni (x1; :::; xn) =
R xi
si 1;i
[f(d(xi 1; z)) + ci 1   f(d(xi; z))  ci]dz
+
R si 1;i+1
xi
[f(d(xi 1; z)) + ci 1   f(d(xi; z))  ci]dz
+
R si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[f(d(xi+1; z)) + ci+1   f(d(xi; z))  ci]dz
=
R xi 1+xi
2
si 1;i
[F (z)  F (xi 1) + ci 1   (F (xi)  F (z) + ci)]dz
+
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
[F (z)  F (xi 1) + ci 1   (F (xi)  F (z) + ci)]dz
+
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi
[F (z)  F (xi 1) + ci 1   (F (z)  F (xi) + ci)]dz
+
R si 1;i+1
xi 1+xi+1
2
[F (z)  F (xi 1) + ci 1   (F (z)  F (xi) + ci)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z) + ci+1   (F (z)  F (xi) + ci)]dz
+
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z) + ci+1   (F (z)  F (xi) + ci)]dz
  R si 1;i+1xi 1+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z) + ci+1   (F (z)  F (xi) + ci)]dz
= Hi (x1; :::; xn) 
R si 1;i
xi 1+xi
2
[2F (z)  F (xi 1)  F (xi) + ci 1   ci]dz
+
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1) + F (xi)  2F (z) + ci+1   ci]dz
  R si 1;i+1xi 1+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1) + F (xi 1)  2F (z) + ci+1   ci 1]dz
+(ci 1   ci)xi+1 xi2 + (ci+1   ci)xi xi 12 :
Finally, to prove the Lemma for i = n consider
Nn (x1; :::; xn) =
R 1
sn 1;n
[f(d(z; xn 1)) + cn 1   f(d(z; xn))  cn]dz
=
R xn
sn 1;n
[F (z)  F (xn 1) + cn 1   (F (xn)  F (z) + cn)]dz
+
R 1
xn
[F (z)  F (xn 1) + cn 1   (F (z)  F (xn) + cn)]dz
=   R sn 1;nxn 1+xn
2
[2F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (xn) + cn 1   cn]dz
+
R xn
xn 1+xn
2
[F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (xn) + F (z)]dz + (cn 1   cn)xn xn 12
+
R 1
xn
[F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (z) + F (xn)]dz + (cn 1   cn)(1  xn)
= Hn (x1; :::; xn) 
R sn 1;n
xn 1+xn
2
[2F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (xn) + cn 1   cn]dz
+(cn 1   cn)xn xn 12 + (cn 1   cn)(1  xn)
which completes the proof of the Lemma.
We now calculate the total shipping cost function TN(x1; :::; xn).
TN(x1; :::; xn) =
R s1;2
0
[f(d(z; x1)) + c1]dz + :::+
R si;i+1
si 1;i
[f(d(z; xi)) + ci]dz
+:::+
R 1
sn 1;n
[f(d(z; xn)) + cn]dz
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The following Lemma holds true.
Lemma 5.
TN(x1; :::; xn) = T
H(x1; :::; xn) + c1x1
+c1
x2 x1
2
+ :::+ ci
xi xi 1
2
+ ci
xi+1 xi
2
+ :::+ cn
xn xn 1
2
+ cn(1  xn)
+
Pn 1
i=1
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[2F (z)  F (xi)  F (xi+1) + ci   ci+1]dz
Proof.
TN(x1; :::; xn) =
R x1
0
[F (x1)  F (z) + c1]dz
+
R x1+x2
2
x1
[F (z)  F (x1) + c1]dz
+
R s1;2
x1+x2
2
[F (z)  F (x1) + c1]dz + :::
  R si 1;ixi 1+xi
2
[F (xi)  F (z) + ci]dz
+
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
[F (xi)  F (z) + ci]dz +
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
[F (z)  F (xi) + ci]dz
+
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (z)  F (xi) + ci]dz  
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z) + ci+1]dz
+
R xi+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1)  F (z) + ci+1]dz +
R xi+1+xi+2
2
xi+1
[F (z)  F (xi+1) + ci+1]dz
+
R si+1;i+2
xi+1+xi+2
2
[F (z)  F (xi+1) + ci+1]dz + :::
  R sn 1;nxn 1+xn
2
[F (xn)  F (z) + cn]dz
+
R xn
xn 1+xn
2
[F (xn)  F (z) + cn]dz +
R 1
xn
[F (z)  F (xn) + cn]dz
=
R x1
0
[F (x1)  F (z)]dz + c1x1 +
R x1+x2
2
x1
[F (z)  F (x1)]dz + c1 x2 x12
+
R s1;2
x1+x2
2
[2F (z)  F (x1)  F (x2) + c1   c2]dz + :::+
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
[F (xi)  F (z)]dz
+ci
xi xi 1
2
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
[F (z)  F (xi)]dz + ci xi+1 xi2
+
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[2F (z)  F (xi)  F (xi+1) + ci   ci+1]dz + :::
+
R sn 1;n
xn 1+xn
2
[2F (z)  F (xn 1)  F (xn) + cn 1   cn]dz
+
R xn
xn 1+xn
2
[F (xn)  F (z)]dz + cn xn xn 12 +
R 1
xn
[F (z)  F (xn)]dz + cn(1  xn)
completing the proof of the Lemma.
Proposition 6. The marginal aggregate shipping cost with respect to the location of rm i, i = 1; :::; n, is
opposite to the marginal prot of rm i, i.e.
@TN(x1; :::; xn)=@xi =  @Ni (x1; :::; xn)=@xi
Proof. We prove the Proposition for i, 1 < i < n; the border cases, for i = 1 and i = n, being very similar.
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According to Lemma 4
@Ni (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
=
@Hi (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
  1
2
(ci 1   ci) + 12(ci+1   ci)
+ @
@xi
R si 1;i
xi 1+xi
2
[F (xi 1) + F (xi)  2F (z) + ci   ci 1]dz

+ @
@xi
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1) + F (xi)  2F (z) + ci+1   ci]dz

+ @
@xi
R si 1;i+1
xi 1+xi+1
2
[2F (z)  F (xi+1)  F (xi 1) + ci 1   ci+1]dz

(9a)
On the other hand, from Lemma 5, we get
@TN (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
= @T
H(x1;:::;xn)
@xi
+ ci 1
2
+ ci
2
  ci
2
  ci+1
2
+ @
@xi
Pn 1
j=1
R sj;j+1
xj+xj+1
2
[2F (z)  F (xj)  F (xj+1) + cj   cj+1]dz
 (9b)
For all j 6= i  1; i
@
@xi
"Z sj;j+1
xj+xj+1
2
[2F (z)  F (xj)  F (xj+1) + cj   cj+1]dz
#
= 0
turning (9a) into
@Ni (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
=
@Hi (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
  ci 1
2
+ ci+1
2
+ @
@xi
R si 1;i
xi 1+xi
2
[F (xi 1) + F (xi)  2F (z) + ci   ci 1]dz

+ @
@xi
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[F (xi+1) + F (xi)  2F (z) + ci+1   ci]dz
 (10a)
and (9b) into
@TN (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
= @T
H(x1;:::;xn)
@xi
+ ci 1
2
  ci+1
2
+ @
@xi
R si 1;i
xi 1+xi
2
[2F (z)  F (xi 1)  F (xi) + ci 1   ci]dz

+ @
@xi
R si;i+1
xi+xi+1
2
[2F (z)  F (xi)  F (xi+1) + ci   ci+1]dz
 (10b)
Proposition 1 of the homogeneous case ensures that @T
H(x1;:::;xn)
@xi
=  @Hi (x1;:::;xn)
@xi
, therefore the right-hand
sides of (10a) and (10b) are equal proving the Proposition.
From the analysis so far, we get that socially optimal locations satisfy the system
@TN(x1; :::; xn)=@xi = 0, i = 1; :::; n: (11)
whereas Nash equilibrium locations satisfy
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@Ni (x1; :::; xn)=@xi = 0, i = 1; :::; n: (12)
Proposition 7. In models of spatial price discrimination, where rms, o¤er the same good and the market
is represented by a closed interval, the Nash equilibrium locations of rms are socially optimal.
Proof. By a linear transformation any closed interval can be mapped in a one-to-one way onto [0; 1]. The
rest of the proof follows by Proposition 6 which ensures that the system of (11) and (12) are equivalent
and therefore have the same solution.
2.4 Mixed oligopoly with heterogeneous rms
The consumer surplus generated for the consumers buying from rm i is
CSNi (x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
R s1;2
0
[m  f(d(x2; z))  c2]dz for i = 1
R si 1;i+1
si 1;i
[m  f(d(z; xi 1))  ci 1]dz
+
R si;i+1
si 1;i+1
[m  f(d(xi+1; z))  ci+1]dz
for 1 < i < n
R 1
sn 1;n
[m  f(d(z; xn 1))  cn 1]dz for i = n
Following a similar analytical reasoning with section 2.2, we get the following proposition
Proposition 8.
nX
i=1
Ni (x1; :::; xn) + CS
N(x1; :::; xn) = m  TN(x1; :::; xn)
where CSN(x1; :::; xn) =
nP
i=1
CSNi (x1; :::; xn) is the total consumerssurplus when rms are heterogeneous.
Proof. Straightforward calculations.
Similar to section 2.2, the prot function of the partly publicly owned rm l when marginal costs of
production are di¤erent will be
Nl (x1; :::; xn) = 
N
l (x1; :::; xn) + (1  al)
"X
i6=l
Ni (x1; :::; xn) + CS
N(x1; :::; xn)
#
(13)
where Nl would be the prot function of rm l if it was fully privately owned.
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Proposition 9. When rms are heterogeneous, Nash equilibria remain socially optimal regardless of the
degree of privatization of the individual rms l; 1  l  n.
Proof. Fix a random l; 1  l  n. Using Proposition 8 and (13), we get
Nl (x1; :::; xn) = 
N
l (x1; :::; xn) + (1  al)

m  TN(x1; :::; xn)  Nl (x1; :::; xn)

From Proposition 6
@TN=@xl =  @Nl =@xl ()  @TN=@xl   @Nl =@xl = 0
which implies that @ Nl =@xl = @
N
l =@xl. Induction on i completes the proof.
3 The case of multiple goods with heterogeneous rms
3.1 Private rms
We now assume the existence of L di¤erent goods or di¤erent varieties of the same good or both. Let kj
denote the number of rms producing good j, j = 1; :::; L with 1  kj  n. Let TN;j denote the aggregate
transportation cost related to the provision of good j and N;ji the corresponding prot per consumer of
rm i from selling good j with N;ji := 0 if good j is not produced by rm i. The fraction of consumers
buying product j is now denoted by hj 2 (0; 1] uniformly spread over [0; 1] with
LP
j=1
hj = 1; hence, there will
be buyers for all available products. In the case where good j is produced by only one rm, then this rm
enjoys monopoly privileges and charges a price equal to, or innitesimally smaller than, the reservation
price mj, i.e. the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay for good j. A fundamental assumption in
this multi-good setting is that m1 = ::: = mL = m (i.e. the reservation price of all goods is identical).9 Let
~TN denote the aggregate shipping cost for all products and ~Ni the total prot of rm i for all products it
produces.
Proposition 10. The marginal aggregate shipping cost with respect to the location of rm i is opposite to
the marginal prot of rm i, namely @ ~TN=@xi =   @ ~Ni =@xi.
Proof. By denition ~TN =
LP
j=1
hjT
N;j and ~Ni =
LP
j=1
hj
N;j
i . Applying Proposition 6 for every single traded
product j we get
@ ~TN=@xi =
LX
j=1
hj@T
N;j=@xi =  
LX
j=1
hj@
N;j
i =@xi =  @ ~Ni =@xi
9It should be noted that this assumption is more realistic in the case of the di¤erent varieties of the same good and less
in the case of di¤erent goods.
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Theorem 1. In models of spatial price discrimination, where rms have di¤erent marginal production
costs, produce di¤erent combination of goods, consumers are distributed uniformly along a linear city of
unit length and have the same reservation price for all goods, the Nash equilibrium locations of rms are
socially optimal.
Proof. To derive the socially optimal locations we have to minimize ~TN with respect to each rms location.
Hence, the socially optimal locations satisfy the following system of equations:
@ ~TN=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (14)
On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium locations are given by the solution of the following system:
@ ~Ni =@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (15)
Because of Proposition 10, systems (14) and (15) are equivalent and hence they have the same set of
solutions.
3.2 Mixed oligopoly
Lets now turn to the case where some rm, say rm l is partly privately owned and partly publicly owned.
Keeping the notation the same as in subsections 2.4 and 3.1, Nl =
LP
j=1
hj 
N;j
l where hj 
N;j
l is the prot of
the partially privatized rm l from selling good j. It is understood that N;jl = 0 if good j is not produced
by rm l.
Theorem 2. The degree of privatization does not a¤ect the socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 9, we have that for every single product j
@ N;jl =@xl = @
N;j
l =@xl :
Therefore,
@ Nl =@xl =
LX
j=1
hj(@ 
N;j
l =@xl) =
LX
j=1
hj@ 
N;j
l =@xl =
LX
j=1
@N;jl =@xl = @
~Ni =@xi
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Theorem 3. In a mixed oligopoly of n rms, with n  3, producing di¤erent combinations of goods
with di¤erentiated marginal production costs and linear transportation costs, there exists a unique socially
optimal Nash equilibrium of locations for any (c1; :::; cn) in the non bounded subset C, of the positive orthant
Rn+, dened by the inequalities
(n  2)ci + (n  2)ci+1   2
nX
cj
j=1;j 6=i;i+1
< 1 (16)
2(n  1)c1   2
nX
j=2
cj < 1 (17)
and
  2
n 1X
j=1
cj + 2(n  1)cn < 1 (18)
for i = 1; :::; n. Further any two marginal cost vectors (c1; :::; cn) and (c
0
1; :::; c
0
n) in the subset C, such that
c0i = ci + u lead to the same equilibrium locations.
Proof. We prove Theorem 3 in the simplest possible setting that of private rms producing only one
common good assuming the per distance transportation cost, t, equal to one. The general case for the
mixed oligopoly with multiple goods and t 6= 1 can then be proved along similar to the analysis above
lines.
According to Proposition 7, the optimal locations must satisfy the system
3x1  x2 =  c1 +c2
 x1 +2x2  x3 =  c1 +c3
 x2 +2x3  x4 =  c2 +c4
...
...
 xn 1 +3xn =  cn 1+cn+2
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It is straightforward to check that the above system is row equivalent to
3x1  x2 =  c1+c2
5
3
x2  x3 =  43c1+13c2+c3
7
5
x3  x4 =  45c1 45c2+35c3+c4
...
...
4n
2n 1xn =   42n 1c1  42n 1c2 :::  42n 1cn 1+4(n 1)2n 1 cn+2
where the i-line 1 < i < n is given by
2i+ 1
2i  1xi   xi+1 =  
4
2i  1c1  
4
2i  1c2   ::: 
4
2i  1ci 1 +
2i  3
2i  1ci + ci+1 :
Solving for xi we get
xi =
2i  1
2i+ 1
[xi+1 +
4
2i  1(ci   c1) + :::+
4
2i  1(ci   c)
+

2i  1(ci   c+1) +
4  
2i  1(ci+1   c+1)
+
4
2i  1(ci+1   c+2) + :::+
4
2i  1(ci+1   ci 1)]
where 2i  3 = 4+ , 0 <  < 4.
Inherent to the discussion leading to Proposition 7 was the assumption that x1 < x2 < ::: < xn. It is a
straightforward, albeit tedious, calculation to show that
xi < xi+1 () (n  2)ci + (n  2)ci+1   2
nX
cj
j=1;j 6=i;i+1
< 1 :
Further, we get
0 < x1 () 2(n  1)c1   2
nX
j=2
cj < 1
and
xn < 1()  2
n 1X
j=1
cj + 2(n  1)cn < 1 :
To prove that the domain, C, dened by the above set of inequalities is not bounded it su¢ ces to consider
all n-tuples (c1; :::; cn) with c1 = ::: = cn (homogeneous case) on the positive part of the main diagonal of
Rn+.
21
Remark 1. The case n = 2 is treated thoroughly in subsection 3.2.1
3.2.1 A duopolistic model of heterogeneous rms - Policy implications
To highlight the policy implications of our ndings in subsection 3.2, we present an application for a
duopoly with linear transportation costs. Let Ci denote the marginal production cost of rm i. There are
three varieties of a di¤erentiated product o¤ered to consumers, U and W from rm 1 and V and W from
rm 2. Let also the fraction of consumers buying only good U equal the fraction of consumers buying good
V , with both set equal to c. Product W is bought by a fraction b of consumers. Transportation costs are
linear and equal to td, where t is a positive scalar and d is the distance shipped. The locations of rm 1
and 2 over the interval [0; 1] are x1 and x2, respectively (without loss of generality x1 < x2). Keeping the
structure of the game and the rest of the notation as above, the prot functions of rms 1 and 2 when
both are privately owned are:
~1 =
 
c(m  C1)  ct2 [x21 + (1  x1)2]

+
0@ R x10 b[t(x2   x1) + C2   C1]dz
+
R (x1+x22 +C2 C12t )
x1
b[t(x1 + x2   2z) + C2   C1]dz
1A (19)
~2 =
 
c(m  C2)  ct2 [x22 + (1  x2)2]

+
0@ R x2(x1+x22 +C2 C12t ) b[t(2z   x1   x2) + C1   C2]dz
+
R 1
x2
b[t(x2   x1) + C1   C2]dz
1A (20)
with C2 C1
2t
 x2 x1
2
.10 The location s of the indi¤erent consumer for goodW is determined by equating
the two delivered costs in regard to the common goodW : t(x2 s)+C2 = t(s x1)+C1 ) s = x1+x22 +C2 C12t .
Having evaluated the integrals, (19) and (20) become
~1 = c(m  C1)  ct2 [x21 + (1  x1)2]
+bx1[t(x2   x1) + C2   C1]
+ b
4t
[t(x2   x1) + C2   C1]2
(19b)
~2 = c(m  C2)  ct2 [x22 + (1  x2)2]
+b(1  x2)[t(x2   x1) + C1   C2]
+ b
4t
[t(x2   x1) + C1   C2]2
(20b)
10If C2 C12t >
x2 x1
2 , both rms are reduced to spatial-price discriminating monopolists where the common good W is now
provided only by rm 1. We consider this case trivial and focus only on the case where C2 C12t  x2 x12 .
22
Firm 1 chooses x1 to maximize (19b), and rm 2 chooses x2 to maximize (20b), leading to the following
Nash equilibrium locations
(x1; x2) =

1
2
  A+ !; 1
2
+ A+ !

(21)
where ! = b(C2 C1)
2t(b+2c)
and A = b
4(b+c)
.
The total shipping cost will be equal to
~T = ct
2
[x21 + (1  x1)2] + ct2 [x22 + (1  x2)2] + cC1 + cC2
+
R x1
0
b[t(x1   z) + C1]dz +
R (x1+x22 +C2 C12t )
x1
b[t(z   x1) + C1]dz

+
0@ R x2(x1+x22 +C2 C12t ) b[t(x2   z) + C2]dz
+
R 1
x2
b[t(z   x2) + C2]dz
1A (22)
Maximizing (22) with respect to x1 and x2 gives the socially optimal locations

1
2
  A+ !; 1
2
+ A+ !

(23)
We now turn to the case where rm 2 is partly privately owned and partly publicly owned in proportions
a2 and 1  a2, respectively with a2 2 [0; 1]. In this case, the prots of rm 2 will be
2 = c(m  C2)  ct2 [x22 + (1  x2)2]
+b(1  x2)[t(x2   x1) + C1   C2]
+ b
4t
[t(x2   x1) + C1   C2]2 + (1  a2)g(x1; x2)
(24)
where
g(x1; x2) =
 
c(m  C1)  ct2 [x21 + (1  x1)2]

+
0@ R x10 b[t(x2   x1) + C2   C1]dz
+
R (x1+x22 +C2 C12t )
x1
b[t(x1 + x2   2z) + C2   C1]dz
1A
+
R (x1+x22 +C2 C12t )
0 b[m  t(x2   z)  C2]dz
+
R 1
(x1+x22 +
C2 C1
2t )
b[m  t(z   x1)  C1]dz
= (b+c)
2
[2tx1(1  x1) + 2m  t  2C1]
(25)
It is straightforward to show that @g(x1; x2)=@x2 = 0 showing that the equilibrium remains intact
irrespective of the degree, a2, of privatization.
Furthermore, the distance between the optimal locations, x1 and x2, is independent of marginal pro-
duction costs and t and equals 2A. It follows that anybody who wishes to inuence the location x1 of
23
either rm 1, with x1 2 (0; 1=2),11 or the location of rm 2, x2, with x2 2 (1=2; 1), can do so by intervening
on the marginal cost relative di¤erence, C2   C1. For example, given an a priori X 2 (0; 1=2), it su¢ ces
to choose C1 < C2 in such a way that C2   C1 = 2t(b+2c)b (X   12 + A) for rm 1 to locate optimaly on the
given X.
4 Conclusion
We have proved that when rms exercise spatial price discrimination, the equilibrium outcome is socially
optimal and independent of the underlying assumptions on the number of rms, rm heterogeneity, the
nature of transportation costs, the number or the varieties of the provided goods and the degree of pri-
vatization. Even though we expect our ndings to hold when consumers are non-uniformly distributed,
we have intentionally opted for the less technically demanding setting of consumer uniform distribution to
showcase the essence of our ideas. The technical requirements in relation to the non-uniformly distributed
case are thoroughly presented in Lederer and Hurter (1986). To the best of our knowledge, our analysis
is the rst attempt to present an holisticview of models of spatial price discrimination. Moreover, our
ndings verify the robustness of the laissez-fairedoctrine and can be easily applied to the case of verti-
cally related markets (see Eleftheriou and Michelacakis, 2016). It is also not hard to deduce the validity
of our ndings for discontinuedmarkets where specic locations are ruled out. Possible extensions could
investigate strategic delegation e¤ects and spatial two dimensional markets.
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